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S U M M A R Y
Background: Over 25 000 pilgrims from the UK visit Saudi Arabia every year for the Umrah and Hajj
pilgrimages. The recent outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in South
Korea and the continuing reports of MERS-CoV cases from Saudi Arabia highlight the need for active
surveillance for MERS-CoV in returning pilgrims or travellers from the Middle East. Public Health
England Birmingham Laboratory (PHEBL) is one of a few selected UK public health laboratories
responsible for MERS-CoV screening in travellers returning to the UK from the Middle East who present
to hospital with severe respiratory symptoms. The results of the PHEBL MERS-CoV screening and
surveillance over the past 3 years is presented.
Methods: UK travellers/pilgrims who returned from the Middle East and presented to a hospital with
respiratory symptoms were studied over the period February 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015. Patients
with respiratory symptoms, who satisﬁed the Public Health England MERS-CoV case algorithm, were
tested for MERS-CoV and other respiratory tract viruses on admission to hospital.
Results: Two hundred and two patients suspected of having MERS-CoV were tested. None of them had a
laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS-CoV infection. A viral aetiology was detected in half (50.3%) of the cases,
with rhinoviruses, inﬂuenza A (H1N1 and H3N2), and inﬂuenza B being most frequent. Peak testing
occurred following the annual Hajj season and in other periods of raised national awareness.
Conclusions: Respiratory tract infections in travellers/pilgrims returning to the UK from the Middle East
are mainly due to rhinoviruses, inﬂuenza A, and inﬂuenza B. Whilst MERS-CoV was not detected in the
202 patients studied, heightened awareness of the possibility of MERS-CoV and continuous proactive
surveillance are essential to rapidly identify cases of MERS-CoV and other seasonal respiratory tract
viruses such as avian inﬂuenza, in patients presenting to hospital. Early identiﬁcation and isolation may
prevent outbreaks in nosocomial settings.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
was ﬁrst isolated in a patient with fatal pneumonia and renal* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Sowsan.Atabani@phe.gov.uk (S.F. Atabani).
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1201-9712/ 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International S
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).failure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in June 2012.1 A
further nine patients in Jordan were detected retrospectively.2 The
disease was named Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and
it presents as a clinical spectrum ranging from asymptomatic to a
severe fulminant multisystem disease affecting all organs.3 MERS-
CoV has remained on the radar of global public health authorities
since its ﬁrst discovery in 2012 because of recurrent nosocomial
and community outbreaks and its association with severe diseaseociety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
Table 1
Demographic characteristics of 202 patients tested, February 2013 to December
2015
0–16 years 17–65 years >65 years Total (%)
Male 5 84 28 117 (57.9)
Female 5 55 25 85 (42.1)
Total (%) 10 (5.0) 139 (68.8) 53 (26.2) 202 (100)
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ities. MERS-CoV is endemic throughout the Arabian Peninsula,4
although Saudi Arabia appears to bear the majority of reported
cases. MERS-CoV cases have been reported in travellers to the
Middle East returning to Europe, North Africa, North America, and
Asia.3,5–7 Whilst primary transmission of MERS-CoV appears to be
from camels, evidence of person-to-person and nosocomial
transmission of MERS-CoV is well documented.8,9
The largest outbreak of MERS-CoV outside the Middle East
occurred in South Korea in 2015 and was attributed to poor
hospital infection control measures.9 This outbreak only serves to
highlight the continued threat of this novel virus to global health
security and calls for all health systems to have proactive MERS-
CoV surveillance and screening systems in place for ill returning
travellers from the Middle East.
Three of the four laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of MERS-CoV
reported in the UK in 2013 were initially identiﬁed by the Public
Health England Birmingham Laboratory (PHEBL).8 The ﬁrst of these
cases was in a traveller returning from KSA following a religious
pilgrimage. The UK is home to over two million Muslims, who
make up 4.8% of the overall population of England and Wales,10
and these Muslims will visit Mecca and Medina in the KSA for
religious purposes at least once in a lifetime. There are three main
religious ceremonies or events that occur in KSA,11 for which over
25 000 pilgrims from the UK travel to KSA each year: (1) the Hajj,
which is the main obligatory pilgrimage and attracts up to three
million pilgrims per year, (2) Umrah, which is a mini pilgrimage
and is undertaken at any time during the year, and (3) Ramadan,
the month of fasting. During these events, mass gatherings of
pilgrims group together and simultaneously carry out the various
religious rituals over a period of days or weeks. These mass
gatherings are known to be associated with the transmission of a
range of infectious diseases, with respiratory tract infections being
exceedingly common.11
Birmingham is the second largest city in the UK, and 21% of its
population are Muslims.10 The city also acts as a hub for travel to
and from the Middle East from the surrounding areas. The regional
public health laboratory situated in Birmingham provides a 7-day
service. It is one of the few laboratories in the UK that has been
responsible for enhanced surveillance covering the South West, the
Midlands and the North of England, for returning travellers with
severe respiratory symptoms that ﬁt the clinical and epidemiologi-
cal criteria of the Public Health England (PHE) MERS-CoV
algorithm.12 A detailed analysis of the results from this continued
surveillance for MERS-CoV and other viral respiratory tract
infections was conducted, which included the period over the
three Hajj seasons of 2013, 2014, and 2015.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Patients
From February 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015, returning
travellers presenting to hospitals in the Midlands, South West, and
North England with respiratory symptoms were actively investi-
gated. Risk assessments were performed routinely by liaison
between the PHE Birmingham consultant virologist and the
referring hospital microbiologist, including advice on infection
control precautions for healthcare workers, sample preparation,
and transport arrangements. Patients were admitted or moved to
hospital side rooms and staff instructed to use FFP3 masks and
personal protective equipment (PPE) until MERS-CoV had been
excluded by laboratory testing. Local health protection teams were
routinely involved, both at the time of presentation and when the
results of testing became available.2.2. Samples
Both upper respiratory tract (URT) samples, such as nose and
throat swabs and nasopharyngeal aspirates, and lower respiratory
tract (LRT) samples, such as sputum and bronchoalveolar lavage
samples, were tested. The sample type provided was dependent on
the severity of infection and urgency of testing. PHE ensured that
all samples were transported using category B shipping regula-
tions, in accordance with World Health Organization guidance on
the regulation for the transport of infectious agents 2013–14,13
using a specialized courier with a ‘same day’ delivery service.
Microbiology investigations were performed routinely in the local
laboratories using PHE guidance on the handling and processing of
samples suspected of MERS-CoV.14 Clotted blood was also
requested and serum stored for possible future serological testing.
2.3. Respiratory virus screening
Investigation for MERS-CoV RNA was included in the routine
panel of respiratory viruses tested for by qualitative real-time
reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR), as described elsewhere.15 The
routine panel included testing for inﬂuenza A (both H1 and H3),
inﬂuenza B, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), rhinoviruses,
parainﬂuenza virus types 1–4, human metapneumovirus, and
adenoviruses.
2.4. Statistical methods
The comparison between the likelihood of virus detection and
the destination of travel (KSA vs. Dubai) was performed using Z-
ratio proportion analysis. The comparison of the duration of




Two hundred and fourteen patients fulﬁlled the criteria of the
PHE case deﬁnition algorithm and were tested for MERS-CoV
infection. Twelve patients were tested elsewhere due to a 5-month
cessation of testing at Birmingham as a result of a PHE policy
change; these patients were excluded from the analysis. The
remaining 202 patient samples were tested at Birmingham. Patient
demographic characteristics are shown in Table 1. The median age
of the patients was 54 years (range 4 months to 85 years).
3.2. Sample types
All (100%) of the 202 samples were tested for MERS-CoV and
other respiratory viruses and the results were reported within 24 h
of sample receipt, which corresponded to the deﬁned PHE
turnaround time. Amongst the positive samples, 57% were from
the LRT. Since one of the criteria for MERS-CoV testing is evidence
of LRT involvement, 39 patients had a sample taken from the LRT in
addition to the URT. In this subset, 21 (53.8%) had a virus detected
Figure 1. (A) Total number of patients with a viral pathogen. (B) Respiratory viral
pathogens detected in returning travellers.
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only, and ﬁve (12.8%) had a virus detected only in the URT sample.
3.3. Respiratory virus detection
Of all the samples obtained from the 202 patients tested, none
was MERS-CoV-positive. However, a viral aetiology for clinical
illness was found in 50.3% of cases, as shown in Figure 1A.
Figure 1B represents the proportions of all the respiratory
viruses detected. An almost equal number of patients were found
to be positive for inﬂuenza A (n = 28; either H1N1 or H3N2) and
rhinovirus (n = 29). Thirteen (6.4%) of the patients were inﬂuenza
B-positive and there were 10 cases (5.0%) of parainﬂuenza virus
(types 1–4), 10 (5.0%) of adenovirus, ﬁve (2.5%) of RSV, and three
(1.5%) of human metapneumovirus. Viral nucleic acid from more
than one virus was simultaneously detected in 14 cases (6.7%),
with one patient having three viruses detected.
A bacterial diagnosis was reported in seven patients: four were
positive for Legionella pneumophila and one was positive for
Streptococcus pneumoniae by urinary antigen testing, one was
positive for Escherichia coli and one for Brucella species on positive
blood culture.
3.4. Travel history
Amongst those with a detailed travel history, the main
countries visited were KSA (46.2%) and Dubai (35.5%). A small
number of travellers were also tested following return from UAE,
Oman, and Iraq. A signiﬁcant difference in proportion of virus
detection in patients returning from KSA vs. Dubai was observed
(p < 0.024).
3.5. Duration of symptoms
The median duration of symptoms prior to sample testing was
5 days (range 1–22 days). No signiﬁcant difference in symptom
duration was observed between patients with or without a positive
viral agent detected (p = 0.384).3.6. Peak testing times
During 2013, the greatest number of samples were tested
following the ﬁrst positive MERS-CoV patients identiﬁed in
Birmingham, rather than during the Ramadan (July–August) or
Hajj (November) seasons (Figure 2A).
During 2014, the largest number of samples tested was seen
post-Hajj in October (Figure 2B). Similarly, in 2015, the largest
number of samples tested was during the post-Hajj season in
October (Figure 2C), with an increase in testing also observed
following the outbreak reported in South Korea in May 2015.
4. Discussion
During the 3-year period of MERS-CoV surveillance, there were
no cases of MERS-CoV detected by laboratory testing in
202 returning pilgrims or other travellers to the UK who presented
to hospitals with respiratory symptoms. This concurs with the
wider global ﬁnding of no record of person-to-person transmission
of MERS-CoV during the mass gatherings at the Hajj during the
period 2013–15.16 Since the diagnostic yield of MERS-CoV is
dependent on the quality and type of respiratory tract sample,17
MERS-CoV cases may have been missed. Furthermore, since MERS-
CoV causes a wide clinical spectrum of presentations from mild to
severe,3 there is a possibility that returning pilgrims with MERS-
CoV infection are being missed since they may recover without
presenting to healthcare or may recover before a diagnosis is made.
Thus the follow-up of patients to test for seroconversion and
further epidemiological studies using serological tests18 are
necessary to establish whether any MERS CoV infections occur
in pilgrims that we are unaware of.
The main ﬁnding of this study was that approximately 50% of
the patient samples had one or more respiratory viruses detected.
The viruses most frequently found were inﬂuenza A and
rhinovirus, in approximately equal proportions. This is in contrast
to some previous reports, which have indicated inﬂuenza A to be
predominant.19,20 As beﬁts the investigation of a LRT illness, the
site of sampling appeared to have a bearing on the likelihood of a
virus being detected: almost 60% of all positive results were
obtained from LRT samples. Where patients had samples obtained
from both the LRT and URT, and thus a direct comparison of results
could be made, inﬂuenza A was more likely to be detected in LRT
samples, whereas rhinovirus, parainﬂuenza, and inﬂuenza B were
more likely in URT samples. This ﬁnding emphasizes the role
played by inﬂuenza A in the development of pneumonia, and also
the desirability of obtaining the most reliable specimen type to
give an accurate diagnosis. This mirrors the optimal approach to
the detection of MERS-CoV with the reported pronounced and
prolonged shedding of virus from the LRT.21
By extension, this frequency of detection of inﬂuenza A and B in
patients suspected of having MERS-CoV infection also supports the
use of empirical antiviral treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors
pending the results of laboratory testing. Indeed, the use of
antivirals should not be dependent on the prevailing likelihood of
circulating inﬂuenza in the UK, since most travellers arrived back
in the UK outside of the seasonal inﬂuenza activity period and most
likely had acquired it following exposure to other Hajj pilgrims
travelling from the Southern hemisphere.
Analysis of the proportions of travellers being positive for any
virus in relation to their travel history showed that a signiﬁcantly
greater proportion were positive if they had travelled from KSA.
Since the overwhelming reason for visiting KSA is for religious
pilgrimage, this suggests a higher likelihood of viral exposure
associated with such a mass gathering. In particular, together with
the above data implicating inﬂuenza A in the development of LRT
infections, it is recommended that a documented history of
Figure 2. (A) Testing in 2013 by month. (B) Testing in 2014 by month; the asterisk (*) indicates the period of time between April and August 2014 in which testing for MERS-
CoV ceased at Public Health England Birmingham Laboratory and testing was transferred to the Public Health England laboratory in London, but resumed post-Ramadan. (C)
Testing in 2015 by month.
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part of the pre-assessment of all Hajj pilgrims, in a similar fashion
to the meningococcal vaccine pre-requisite.
All patients had a sample collected for MERS-CoV testing within
24 h of hospital presentation, indicating that the hospital staff
showed appropriate awareness of travel risk factors. Peak demand
for MERS-CoV testing was associated with times of increased
public health awareness of the incidence of MERS; for example,
after the detection of three MERS cases in Birmingham, the
immediate post-Hajj pilgrimage period, and more recently, duringthe outbreak in South Korea. Even with these ﬂuctuations in
demand, it is imperative to maintain heightened awareness and
enhanced surveillance with rapid detection of viral pathogens.22
This should ensure that an outbreak due to MERS-CoV or other
seasonal respiratory viruses, does not result from an undiagnosed
returning traveller. MERS-CoV continues to spread within the
Middle East and remains a global public health risk. The South
Korean outbreak9 and the nosocomial outbreaks in KSA emphasize
the importance of recognizing that healthcare workers can be
exposed to MERS-CoV patients seeking medical care.23,24
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